FPC Refund Powers Under the Natural Gas Act by unknown
A DMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1971
and examine witnesses in a mandatory injunction proceeding, and the
rejection of a request for an evidentiary hearing on objections to a
compromise settlement can all significantly affect the presentation of
the charging party's appeal. Professor Jaffe notes that the NLRA "is
almost alone in committing to the sole enforcement of a public agency
a policy which is universally recognized as vindicating individual and
group interests."46 The realization that victims of unfair labor prac-
tices are largely dependent upon the adequacy of Board proceedings
for the protection of their interests demands that courts closely exam-
ine any circumscription of procedural rights which would reduce the
one safeguard available to the charging party-judicial review of
administrative actions.
V. REFUND POWERS
FPC REFUND POWERS UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT
The "refund power" is the equitable power of a regulatory agency
to order the return of rate charges improperly assessed.' The most
retroactive and effective application of the refund power is the "repar-
ation order," defined as the assessment of damages caused by the
unreasonableness of past rates.2 Although some federal agencies have
C.F.R. § 101.4 (1971); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 833 (1971); 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.53, at 135 (1968). The
charging party is expected to cooperate with the Board officer, but may participate in the
investigation only to the extent of furnishing facts and informally presenting his theories of
applicable law. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 833-34. If the investigating officer feels that
the charge is without merit he may formally refuse to issue a complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6
(1971); DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra, at 834; see 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1971). Although this
refusal is appealable to the General Counsel, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6, 102.19 (1971), DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra, at 834, if the determination of the investigating officer is affirmed, the
charging party has no further avenue of appeal. Contractors' Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 (1962); J. JENKINS, supra; DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra, at 834.
46. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 726.
1. The refund power is effectuated through use of the "refund order," which may be
fashioned in a variety of forms. One common use, for example, is the return of a portion of
increased rate charges which are allowed to take effect pending final administrative approval.
See Note, Use of the Refund Device in Rate Regulation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1950);
notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
2. See Clark, Protection of the Consumer Under the Natural Gas Act-Refunds and
Reparations, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261, 270 (1945). This broad definition of "reparation"
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been expressly granted power to award damages and reparations, 3 the
Federal Power Commission was implicitly denied any such broad
retroactive rate-making powers under the Natural Gas and Federal
Power Acts. 4 For many years, this prohibition against FPC repara-
tion power was given a broad construction. Consequently, the ability
of the FPC to effectively police the pricing of interstate gas and
electric power was seriously restricted.
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and Lagging Response of FPC
Rate-Making Machinery
Under the Natural Gas Act, the refund power could theoretically
be used by the FPC in three major rate regulatory situations: rate-
change proceedings,5 rate-fixing proceedings,' and permanent certifi-
cation proceedings.7 The FPC has expressly been granted a refund
is used, for example, under Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, note 3 infra, granting the
ICC the power to regulate railroad and pipeline carriers. See Meiklejohn, Reparations and
Overcharges Under Part IH Under the Interstate Commerce Act. 19 AD. L. Rav. 203, 210
(1967). A narrowed definition, however, has been legislatively provided in Part II of that Act
for motor carrier regulation. See Meiklejohn, supra, at 210.
3. Department of Agriculture, under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 309(e), 7
U.S.C. § 210(e) (1970); see Bowman, Reparations Claims Under the Packers and Stockyards
Act, 22 FED. B.J. 92 (1962); Department of Agriculture, under the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(a) (1970); see Endres, Reparations Procedure
Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodoties Act of 1930, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 719
(1960); FCC, under the Communications Act of 1934, § 209, 47 U.S.C. § 209 (1970); ICC,
under the Interstate Commerce Act Part 1, § 16(1), 49 U.S.C. § 16(1) (1970) (against railroad
and oil pipeline carriers); and under the Interstate Commerce Act Part Ill, § 308(d), 49 U.S.C.
§ 908(d) (1970) (against water carriers).
Traditionally, where administrative imposition of reparation awards is expressly authorized
by statute, retroactive recovery has been allowed when the original rate was set privately, Eagle
Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 51 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1931), but denied when the
improper rate was fixed or approved formally by a commission. Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932); Texas Co. v. Chicago & Alton R. Co.,
117 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1940); see Hardman, Administrative Finality in Claims for Over-
charges, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 77, 79-80, 105 (1948).
4. See notes 24, 32-33 infra and accompanying text. The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717-
17w (1970), applies to the transportation and sale for resale of natural gas in interstate com-
merce. Id. § 717(b). The analogous regulatory scheme in the Federal Power Act is Part II of
that Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-28c (1970), which extends to the transmission and wholesale sale
of electric energy in interstate commerce. Id. § 824(b). Part I of the Federal Power Act, id.
§§ 791a-823, is the old Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920), and applies
to the licensing of hydro-electric facilities along waters which are within congressional jurisdic-
tion. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
5. Natural Gas Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
6. Id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 717d.
7. Id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 717f.
[Vol. 1972:115
A DMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1971
power for use in rate-change proceedings, but the Natural Gas Act is
silent with regard to refund powers in the latter two situations. In the
rate-change situation, any jurisdictional sellers who desires to raise his
rates is required by section 4 of the Act to file with the FPC a 30-day
notice of his proposed rate change. The proposed rate becomes subject
to an expressly granted section 4 refund power should the new rate
be given effect by the FPC and later found to be excessive In the rate-
fixing situation, a natural gas seller might be operating with costs
low enough to justify an FPC reduction of rates. To accomplish this
reduction, the FPC is empowered under section 5 of the Act to initiate
formal proceedings, upon its own motion or the complaint of a pri-
vate party, investigate the existing rates of jurisdictional sellers, and
establish a "just and reasonable" rate to be charged in the future. 0
Since any rate fixed by the FPC is expressly limited by section 5 to
prospective operation, the courts have by implication denied the Com-
mission retroactive refund power in this formal rate-fixing situation."
The above rate-change and rate-fixing situations apply to all juris-
dictional parties, which includes those sellers who are already operat-
ing under an FPC certificate of public convenience and necessity as
required by the Natural Gas Act. 12 The third potential rate-setting
situation, the section 7 permanent certification proceeding, 3 applies,
on the other hand, to sellers who are temporarily certified or uncerti-
fied. Because of its increasing importance the permanent certificate
proceeding will be the major focus of this section. Expansive FPC
interpretation of its own jurisdiction imposes the obligation to obtain
certification upon many previously uncertified sellers. These FPC ju-
risdictional decisions, however, are often appealed. In such cases,
many affected sellers await a final judicial resolution of the jurisdic-
tional issue before seeking certification,14 and in the interim continue
8. A jurisdictional seller is one who engages in "the transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce [or] . . .the sale in interstate comnierce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption. ... The Act does not apply "to the local distribution of. . .or to the
production or gathering of natural gas." 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970). See note 17 infra.
9. Natural Gas Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d), (e).
10. Id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a).
11. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
12. Natural Gas Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
13. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 717f.
14. See, e.g., Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where
"[v]irtually all of the companies involved in the approximately one thousand natural gas sales
contracts over which the Commission had asserted jurisdiction in 1961 waited until after the
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collecting unreviewed and unregulated rate charges established by
private contract. Due to long delays often encountered in appealing
FPC jurisdictional decisions, 15 it might be many years before certifi-
cation is voluntarily sought by these jurisdictional sellers or forcefully
initiated by the FPC. Furthermore, since it may be time consuming
to set formal section 5 rate-fixing machinery in motion,' 6 it might be
several years more before these new sellers are finally subjected to rate
review and price control. To avoid any permanent injury to the ulti-
mate consumer, it becomes imperative, therefore, for the FPC to
submit such sellers to prospective price control at the time of perma-
nent certification and to require retroactive refund of excessive
charges collected from the time jurisdictional status originally at-
tached. Prior to the developments discussed herein, however, the FPC
failed to use its certification powers as a means of either prospective
or retroactive rate control.
In 1954 the Supreme Court approved the assertion of FPC juris-
diction over the wholesale interstate transactions of independent natu-
ral gas producers. 17 The subsequent increase in the number of sellers
within the FPC's jurisdiction caused such extensive delays in normal
section 5 rate-fixing proceedings that the FPC's failure to assert rate-
regulatory controls in certification proceedings became increasingly
Supreme Court decision in 1965 [California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., see note 83 infra] to
apply to the Commission for certification." Id. at 1335.
15. Compare, e.g., Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F.P.C. 606 (1961) with California v. Lo-
Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366 (1965) (4-year appeal period).
16. See notes 52-53 infra and accompanying text.
17. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 677 (1954). An "independent"
natural gas producer is a party who produces and sells natural gas for resale in interstate
commerce but does not engage in the interstate transmission of gas and is not affiliated with
any interstate natural gas pipeline company. Id. at 675; 18 C.F.R. § 154.91(a) (1971). Before
the Phillips decision, the wholesale interstate transactions of independent producers were be-
lieved to be within the "production or gathering" exception to Natural Gas Act jurisdiction,
15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970). Many commentators have, in fact, argued that the Phillips decision
was wrong and that Congress did not intend to regulate these transactions. See Flittie & Armour,
The Natural Gas Experience-A Study in Regulatory Aggression and Congressional Failure
to Control the Legislative Process, 19 Sw. LJ. 448, 453 (1965); Swift, Federal Power Com-
mission Regulation of Interstate Sales by Independent Natural Gas Producers, 10 S. TEx. L.J.
183, 189-90 (1968); Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 Gao. L.J. 695, 721-
22 (1956).
The interstate natural gas industry consists also of pipeline companies and wholesale distrib-
utors. The bulk of the developments discussed in this section have evolved from FPC regulation
of producers, but their impact is felt by the other members of the industry. See notes 114-15
infra and accompanying text.
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detrimental to its ability to protect the public from excessive rates.18
To cope with this problem, the Supreme Court in 195919 tapped the
FPC's "certificate conditioning" provision as a new source of pro-
spective power for regulating producers' rates. During the subsequent
decade, the FPC's exploitation of this power led to the assertion of
implied, retroactive refund power in the FPC under the Natural Gas
Act,20 and culminated in two 1971 cases, Mesa Petroleum Co. v.
FPC2' and Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC.2 The development of
this new source of power has expanded the reach of the FPC refund
power and, inevitably, narrowed the "no reparations" restriction
imposed on the FPC by the original enactments of the Natural Gas
and Federal Power Acts. It is now settled that in spite of the lack of
express reparation power, the FPC has the power to order refunds for
excessive charges and other rate-based damages caused by the statu-
tory violations of a seller occurring between the time he is put on
notice of his jurisdictional status and the time of final, permanent
certification. This section will analyze the evolution and impact of
these recent developments under the Natural Gas Act. 2
Presumption Against Implied Retroactive Rate-Making Power
The early failure of the FPC to fashion retroactive refund powers
can be attributed to consistent court holdings that the FPC had no
general reparation powers, express or implied, under either the Natu-
ral Gas Act 24 or the Federal Power Act.25 These decisions can be
rationalized by applying three canons of statutory construction to the
legislative history of both acts. The first canon is that there is an
"almost conclusive presumption against [administrative] power to
18. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
19. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1959).
20. FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9 (1968); United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery
Prop., Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965); Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 401 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1968).
21. 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. 450 F.2d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. See note 127 infra for a discussion of the possibility of extending these developments to
activities regulated by the FPC under the Federal Power Act.
24. FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 24 (1968); United Gas Improvement Co. v.
Callery Prop., Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 229 (1965); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
618 (1944); State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 215 F.2d 176, 184 (8th Cir. 1954); Willmut Gas &
Oil Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 12 F.P.C. 132, 146 (1953); see Administrative
Law-Reparations Under the Natural Gas Act, 29 Miss. L.J. 331,332 (1958).
25. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 260 (1951).
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take retroactive action unless Congress plainly specifies such
power." 6 Thus, if agency rate-fixing orders are expressly limited to
prospective operation, it should not be implied that the agency is also
authorized to adjust rates and charges retroactively from the date of
its final order. 21 Second, where Congress has consistently made ex-
press the delegation of a particular power in other statutes, its silence
in any analogous act is strong evidence that it did not intend to grant
that power.2 Third, the deletion of express provisions prior to a bill's
enactment must be given weight in order to avoid "reading into the
Act by implication what the Legislature seemingly rejected. 20
Applying these principles to the legislative history of both FPC
statutes, one finds that the FPC is empowered after its formal section
5 rate hearings to fix a just and reasonable rate "to be thereafter
observed and in force." 3 Furthermore, whereas several analogous
statutes for regulation of industries in interstate commerce expressly
grant administrative power to make damage and reparation orders,31
the FPC acts are silent in this regard. Finally, while a specific agency
reparations provision was carried over from the Interstate Commerce
Act and placed in the original drafts of both the Natural Gas and
Federal Power Acts,32 objections were raised in the hearings and the
26. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. CAB, 169 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1948), affd,
336 U.S. 601 (1949); see Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 371,
395-97 (1967).
27. See Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 464 (1943); Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 650-52, 401 P.2d 353, 363 (1965);
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 315 Mich. 533, 545-47, 24 N.W.2d
200, 205 (1946); cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944).
28. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 348 F.2d 756, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 257 F.2d
229, 230 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958).
29. Alaska v. American Can Co., 358 U.S. 224, 227 (1959); accord, Commonwealth v.
Benoit, 347 Mass. 1, 6-7, 196 N.E.2d 228, 232 (1964); cf. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 106-7 (1941). Butsee Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40,61 (1947).
30. Natural Gas Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1970) (emphasis added); Federal Power
Act § 206(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
31. See note 3 supra.
32. The Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts were drafted originally as Titles III and I1,
respectively, of the Public Utility Act of 1935, H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. Hearings on
H.R. 5423 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., Ist
Sess. 43, 57 (1935). The original reparations provision in the Natural Gas Act provided that:
When complaint has been made to the Commission concerning any rate or charge for
any service performed by any distributor, and the Commission has found after investiga-
tion that the distributor has charged an unreasonable, excessive, or discriminatory
amount for such service in violation of any provision of this title, the Commission may
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provision was deleted from both acts during committee redrafting.
Under both the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts, therefore, the
legislative history provides a strong presumption against implying
FPC authority to award reparations or fix rates retroactively from the
date of its final rate order.
The underlying rationale for the deletion of express reparation
powers from the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts was a perceived
need for a willingness to rely on arms-length bargaining and private
contracting for the establishment of initial rates in the interstate natu-
ral gas and electric utility industries.Y Recognizing a need "for indivi-
dualized arrangements between natural gas companies and distribu-
tors, the Natural Gas Act permit[ted] the relations between the par-
ties to be established initially by contract, the protection of the public
interest being afforded by supervision of the individual contracts. '3 5
This was not deemed an appropriate regulatory area for agency repar-
ation power. During the congressional hearings, for example, the FPC
reparation provisions were assailed on the grounds that it would be
unreasonable for a wholesale buyer to receive services at a bargained-
for rate and later be allowed to complain, retroactively, of the rate's
unreasonableness. 6 As stated in the Federal Power Act committee
report, the agency reparation provisions were "appropriate sections
for a State utility law [where the buyer is the individual consumer],
but the committee does not consider them applicable to one governing
wholesale transactions. '37
order that the distributor make due reparation to the complainant, thereunder, with
interest from the date of collection. No such order shall be issued unless the complaint
is filed with the Commission within two years from the date of payment. H.R. 5423,
supra § 314; see 1935 Hearings, supra at 47-48.
The original Federal Power Act contained the identical provision except the words "public
utility" were substituted for "distributor." H.R. 5423, supra § 213; see 1935 Hearings, supra,
at 36.
33. S. RaP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935) (deletion from Federal Power Act).
34. Formulators of the Natural Gas Act "recognize[d] the need for private contracts of
varying terms," United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Co., 350 U.S. 332, 345 (1956),
and sought to preserve "the 'integrity' of private contractual arrangements." United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 114 (1958).
35. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Co., 350 U.S. 332, 339 (1956).
36. See 1935 Hearings, supra note 32, at 1684-85. This argument was introduced originally
in connection with the Federal Power Act by the General Solicitor of the National Association
of Railroad and Utility Commissioners. Id. It was incorporated by reference when identical
amendments were proposed under the Natural Gas Act. Id. at 1690.
37. S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935). This committee report has been given
weight by courts in construing a lack of FPC reparation power under the Natural Gas Act.
See, e.g., Hope Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 287, 310 (4th Cir. 1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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Use of the Express Section 4 Refund Power
Despite the clear legislative intent to limit the retroactive rate-
making powers of the FPC by withholding the power to assess repara-
tions, the Commission began to fortify its arsenal of refund remedies
through use of the limited refund power expressly granted in the rate-
change provisions of section 4 of the Natural Gas Act." Pursuant to
this section, after any proposed rate change has been filed with the
FPC, the Commission may suspend the increased rate for five months
and hold a hearing on its lawfulness. If after five months no determi-
nation has been made, the new rate takes effect automatically, subject
to a refund order should the final decision determine any portion of
the rate change to be unjustified. 3 The issuance of such a quasi-
retroactive refund order is not inconsistent with the prohibition
against FPC reparation power. Rather, the section 4 refund is merely
an administrative technique for allowing a proposed rate to take effect
without the risk of permanent damage to the public in cases where
FPC review is delayed.
Although its express refund power is limited in scope, the FPC has
exploited it as a flexible and equitable means of fulfilling the Act's
underlying purpose of protecting "consumers against exploitation at
the hands of natural gas companies."4 In FPC v. Interstate Natural
Gas Co.,41 for example, the Supreme Court established the authority
of a reviewing court of appeals to "flow through" to the ultimate
consumer the rate-increase refunds collected when an FPC rate order
is stayed pending judicial review. 42 It is now settled that the Commis-
sion also has this flow-through power for section 4 refunds. 43 In fact,
38. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970). Part II of the Federal Power Act has an identical provision,
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1970).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970).
40. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944); accord, United Gas Improve-
ment Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392,402 (1965); FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co., 371 U.S. 145, 154 (1962); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. I, 19
(1961); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954); FPC v. Interstate
Natural Gas Co., 336 U.S. 577, 581 (1949).
41. 336 U.S. 577 (1949).
42. Id. at 584; see Flittie & Armour, supra note 17, at 499-501 (1965). Courts have similarly
"flowed through" refund benefits under the Federal Power Act, recognizing that the intended
beneficiary of rate reductions under that act is also the ultimate consumer. Pennsylvania Water
& Power Co. v. FPC, 203 F.2d 219, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See generally Utility Rate Refunds
in Federal Courts, 6 STAN. L. REV. 492-512 (1954).
43. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 344, 347-49 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 928 (1970).
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the FPC can flow through refunds even when the burden of the unlaw-
ful rate increase has been absorbed by the immediate buyer and not
passed on to the consumer, as long as the buyer is given an opportun-
ity to show his entitlement to the refunds.44
Expanding Role of Certificate-Conditioning Power
An active arsenal of retroactive refund powers was originally
deemed inappropriate for effective FPC regulation of the natural gas
industry. This legislative intent became somewhat outmoded, how-
ever, by developments in the late 1950's which led to an aggressive
use by the FPC of its express statutory power to attach to a certificate
"such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and
necessity may require" 4 -the "certificate-conditioning" power. This
power is expressly granted by the section 7 certification provisions of
the Natural Gas Act, which require that jurisdictional facilities be
operated or extended only after FPC issuance of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity46 and that no jurisdictional facilities or
services be abandoned without prior FPC approval.47 The legislative
history of the certificate-conditioning provision, which was added to
the Act in a 1942 amendment4 8 indicates that Congress envisioned
its use for FPC regulation of many general economic and operational
factors such as a seller's financial stability, adequacy of gas reserves
and adequacy of proposed service.49 But Congress was largely un-
aware of the potential rate-regulating uses of the certificate-condi-
44. 414 F.2d at 348. See Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 1392, 1393-94
(6th Cir. 1971). Another flexible use of the section 4 refund power is demonstrated by the FPC's
authority to order interim rate reductions and refunds during section 4 rate-change proceedings
when a seller's overall rate of return is found excessive and the decision allocating that rate of
return among separate zones of operation is deferred. See FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co., 371 U.S. 145, 146-47 (1962). The broad reach of the consumer-oriented purpose of the
Natural Gas Act is demonstrated further by recent decisions allowing the FPC to require natural
gas companies to flow through to consumers, in the form of reduced rates, the tax benefits
resulting from liberalized depreciation treatment. Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 634 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1966).
45. Natural Gas Act § 7(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1970). There are no FPC certification
powers under the analogous interstate wholesale regulatory scheme of Part II of the Federal
Power Act. S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935); 79 CONG. REC. 8431 (1935)
(remarks of Senator Wheeler).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
47. Id. § f(b).
48. Act of Feb. 7, 1942, ch. 49, 56 Stat. 83.
49. See H. REP. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1941).
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tioning power.' This potential source of rate regulation power re-
mained untapped for well over a decade.
The 1954 Supreme Court decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin5' brought a wave of independent natural gas producers
within the FPC's jurisdiction, causing "inordinate delay" in the for-
mal rate-fixing proceedings under section 5 of the Act and "unprece-
dented regulatory problems of great complexity." 5 2 As warned by the
Supreme Court, "[t]his long delay, without the protection of refund,
as is possible in a section 4 [rate-change] proceeding, would provide
a windfall for the natural gas company with a consequent squall for
the consumers. ' 53 The FPC, however, originally took a narrow view
of its certification power and field prices began to soar as producers
set rates without initial review.54
The Supreme Court came to the rescue in 1959 by holding in
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission55 (CA TCO) that
the FPC should use its certificate-conditioning power to regulate pro-
spectively the initial rates of certified producers' sales "[w]here the
proposed price is not in keeping with the public interest . . . ."I The
FPC implemented the CA TCO decision in producer certification pro-
ceedings by conditioning the issuance of permanent certificates upon
the producer's use of a price which was "in-line" 5 with gas prices
under'contemporaneous certificates already in force in the area of the
proposed sale.-"
50. Administrative Regulation by Conditions in Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity, 21 STAN. L. REv. 188, 190 (1968).
51. 347 U.S. 672 (1954); see note 17 supra.
52. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959); Scott, Federal
Certificate Regulation of Producer Gas Sales: Initial Rates and Related Problems, 18 Sw. L.J.
570, 573 (1964); Administrative Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Rav., supra note 50, at 189-90.
53. 360 U.S. at 390.
54. FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 17 (1968); see E. NEUNER, THe NATURAL GAS
INDUSTRY 281-82 (1960). By 1960 FPC regulation of producers' sales "was described as the
outstanding example in the federal government of the breakdown of the administrative process."
In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 758 (1968).
55. 360 U.S. 378 (1959). This case is commonly referred to, and will be referred to hereinaf-
ter, as CA TCO, which is derived from the names of the producers involved. Scott, 18 Sw. L.J.,
supra note 52, at 574 n.34.
56. 360 U.S. at 391.
57. The "in-line" price is a technical term defined as the price at which "substantial
amounts of gas have been certified to enter the market under other contemporaneous certifi-
cates, no longer subject to judicial review or in any way 'suspect.'" United Gas Improvement
Co. v. Callery Prop., Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 227 (1965).
58. FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1968); Scott, 18 Sw. L.J., supra note
52, at 638-39; see C.F.R. § 2.56 (1971).
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Since the in-line rate was traditionally given effect only prospec-
tively from the date of certificate issuance, it was not used to imple-
ment any retroactive rate adjustments. Nevertheless, the CA TCO
decision made both the FPC and the judiciary aware of the potential
breadth of the certificate-conditioning power of an agency as implied
authority for fashioning new sanctions, especially where needed to
avoid breakdowns in the regulatory process.59 Used in combination
with the FPC's housekeeping power to issue orders and regulations
as "necessary or appropriate" to carry out the provisions of its stat-
utes,"0 it was not long before the certificate-conditioning power be-
came a powerful tool for creating retroactive sanctions in order to
enforce compliance with the FPC's regulatory statutes. This retroac-
tive use of the certificate-conditioning power was commissioned in
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC.61 In Niagara Mohawk a
hydroelectric utility had violated the Federal Power Act by failing to
file promptly for a license after being put on notice of its jurisdictional
status under the Act by virtue of an earlier FPC decision of river
navigability. The FPC was held to have the power to respond to this
situation by back-dating the issuance of the license and imposing,
retroactively, the statutory assessment of license fees and the obliga-
tion to establish amortization reserves for excess earnings. Although
59. See Administrative Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv., supra note 50, at 195. "CA TCO is
a fait accompli which must be dealt with as a significant amendment of the act." Scott, supra
note 52, at 649. Early commentators, on the other hand, had viewed the certificate-conditioning
power as not being an enlargement of the express statutory authority of the FPC. Wheat,
Administration by the Federal Power Commission of the Certificate Provisions of the Natural
Gas Act, 14 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 194, 214-15 (1945).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970); 16 U.S.C. § 825h (1970). The "necessary or appropriate"
("housekeeping") provision has been given a broad construction under both the Natural Gas
and Federal Power Acts. "[T]here is no dearth of decisions making clear that [the 'necessary
or appropriate' provisions] are not restricted to procedural minutiae, and that they authorize
an agency to use means of regulation not spelled out in detail, provided the agency's action
conforms with the purposes and policies of Congress and does not contravene any terms of the
Act." Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967); accord,
Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1971); Jupiter Corp. v. FPC, 424
F.2d 783, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 896-97
(D.C. Cir. 1964). But see Murphy Oil Corp. v. FPC, 431 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1970) (where the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has given a more narrow construction to the "necessary
or appropriate" provision). "[T]he Commission can utilize [the 'necessary or appropriate']
authority to effectuate its orders lawfully entered, but [this provision] is not an enlargement of
the specific authority granted the Commission under §§ 4, 5 and 7 of the [Natural Gas] Act."
Id. at 810.
61. 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
62. Id. at 157; see Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. FPC, 355 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1966); Central
Maine Power Co. v. FPC, 345 F.2d 875, 876 (1st Cir. 1965).
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providing no direct precedent for FPC assertion of refund powers,
Niagara Mohawk made it clear that the certification-conditioning
power could be used to correct retroactively a statutory violation.
The certification and licensing developments begun by CA TCO
laid the foundation for FPC assertion of refund power not only by
exposing the potential use of the certificate-conditioning provision as
an implied source for general FPC retroactive remedies, but also by
shifting the regulatory posture of the Natural Gas Act toward a
higher degree of rate uniformity and more affirmative FPC price
control. The use of in-line price regulation during producer certifica-
tion proceedings inaugurated a trend towards rate uniformity and has
undoubtedly eroded the importance of private bargaining in the estab-
lishment of rates for initial natural gas transactions. Having de-
emphasized private rate bargaining, these certification developments
have thereby undercut a premise upon which retroactive FPC rate-
making was legislatively withheld.13 Consequently, the FPC should
now be more free than ever to manufacture retroactive refund powers
from within its general statutory framework. Moreover, the trend
toward rate uniformity seems to be accelerating. The Supreme Court
has recently approved the FPC practice of setting maximum "just
and reasonable" field rates in section 5 proceedings for an entire area
rather than on a case by case basis for each producer.64 These area
rates can also be used as the initial certification rates for producer
sales which are commenced during pendency of the area rate proceed-
ings, as opposed to using the less accurate, less uniform in-line price. "
FPC regulations achieve further uniformity by greatly limiting the
scope of price-changing provisions which will be allowed in natural
gas producer contracts filed for rate change acceptance or certifica-
tion.66 In short, the developments since private contracts were initially
espoused67 indicate that the natural gas supply "contract and contin-
ued operation under it is seldom free from the closest scrutiny and
63. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
64. In re Permian Basin Area Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 768-77 (1968). The Permian case has
brought formal price control to the field market for natural gas. Kitch, Regulation of the Field
Market for Nataral Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 11 J. LAW & EcoN., 243 (1968).
65. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases 390 U.S. 747, 822 n. 114 (1968); see FPC v.
Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 39 n.25 (1968); Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 982, 986 (5th
Cir. 1970).
66. 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1971) (rate-change filings); id. § 157.25 (certification filings).
67. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Co., 350 U.S. 332, 339, 345 (1956).
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regulatory power of the FPC."'5 The groundwork for using the
certificate-conditioning power as implied authority for FPC refunds
was laid, therefore, not only by expanding the use of this power for
other general retroactive sanctions, but also by diminishing the need
for reliance on private bargaining.
Extension of Certificate-Conditioning Power to Refund Orders
After the Supreme Court in CA TCO introduced the certificate-
conditioning provision as authority for prospective regulation of nat-
ural gas producer rates, it was not long before the FPC began to
adopt this provision as implied authority for the use of retroactive
refund power in certification proceedings. The refund power was ini-
tially used to redress the overcharges caused by sellers who operated
under certificates which lacked final approval and hence were still
subject to the FPC's certificate-conditioning power. Without purport-
ing to disturb the traditional prohibition against FPC reparation
orders, the Supreme Court approved FPC refund orders in two signi-
ficant cases. In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties,
Inc.69 it was held that when an unconditioned permanent certificate is
overturned on judicial review the FPC can condition the new perma-
nent certificate upon refund of charges received under the old certifi-
cate in excess of the subsequently determined in-line price.7" The
Court justified its decision on the grounds that "[w]hile the Commis-
sion 'has no power to make reparation orders,' . . . it is not so re-
stricted where its [certification] order, which never became final, has
been overturned by a reviewing court.' '7 Two rationalizations for the
decision are presented. First, an agency, like a court, can later undo
what has been wrongfully done by virtue of its own original order.12
Second, when a petition for rehearing or review is allowed, the seller
68. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84,90 (5th Cir. 1966).
69. 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
70. This power has been subsequently extended to permit the assessment of a refund after
an unconditioned permanent certificate is overturned on FPC rehearing. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,
401 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1968).
71. 382 U.S. at 229.
72. Id.
73. A "suspect" certificate is one which is still subject to judicial review or FPC rehearing
and is, therefore, not "final," even though it may be permanent.'Under the analogous "suspect
order" rule, the rates associated with a "suspect" certification order are automatically excluded
from consideration in arriving at the local in-line price. Morris, Recent Independent Producer
Certificate Cases: The "Suspect Order" Rule, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 489, 496 (1964); Scott,
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is on notice of the "suspect" 7 3 nature of his rate and "no inequity
results" by subjecting him to refund liability..1
In FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co.75 the Supreme Court held that the
FPC can exercise its certificate-conditioning power to require the
refund of charges collected under temporary certificates76 in excess of
the finally established in-line price, even where the original temporary
certificate had been free of an express refund condition." The Court
reasoned that if the producer-seller's expectations created by a perma-
nent certificate of the type present in Callery "may thus be overriden
by the public interest, then the surely lesser reliance induced by an
'unconditioned' temporary certificate issued on the producer's own
representations should not bar a later refund requirement.""8 The
unreliable, exparte nature of the temporary certificate gives the natu-
ral gas producer sufficient notice to justify refund liability.79
Development of Additional Refund Powers By "Constructive"
Certification
The FPC certificate-conditioning refund power as authorized by
the Callery and Sunray cases was limited in application to the redress
of overcharges of parties already operating under a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity which had not yet become permanent
and nonreviewable. The most significant plateau in the evolution of
FPC refunds, however, was reached by two recent 1971 cases", which,
considered together, have (1) extended the FPC certificate-
conditioning refund power to cover not only overcharges, but other
supra note 52, at 653-54; see note 57 supra. Callery has in essence extended this rule to encom-
pass refund orders. Hence a "suspect" certificate is not only excluded from the calculation of
in-line prices, but after Callery, the apparent taint in its rate schedule is sufficient reason to
justify refund liability also.
74. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 401 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1968).
75. 391 U.S. 9 (1968).
76. The FPC is empowered to issue temporary certificates "in cases of emergency, to assure
maintenance of adequate service or to serve particular customers, without notice or hearing,
pending the determination of an application for a certificate ...... 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)
(1970).
77. 391 U.S. at 45; accord, Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 378 F.2d 510, 531 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 917, 918, 919 (1968); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242, 250
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964).
78. 391 U.S. at45.
79. See Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 378 F.2d 510, 532 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied. 391
U.S. 917, 918, 919 (1968).
80. Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mesa Petroleum
Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
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rate-based statutory violations; and (2) have applied this power to
sellers who have no certificate at all, but who are within FPC jurisdic-
tion and have a duty to obtain a certificate. In essence these sellers
are "constructively" certified back to the date of their initial jurisdic-
tional status and then brought within the purview of the Callery and
Sunray doctrines.
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC81 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit allowed the FPC to order the refund of overcharges and
the payment of abandonment damages by a producer-seller who had
failed to file for a certificate and had illegally abandoned a jurisdic-
tional transaction in violation of the Natural Gas Act. A natural gas
producer had been placed on notice of his jurisdictional status when
the FPC asserted jurisdiction over an identical sales transaction.82
Instead of submitting to an FPC in-line rate review by filing for a
certificate, the producer continued to operate without certification
and waited for a Supreme Court determination of the highly question-
able jurisdictional issue. Four years later the Supreme Court in
California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co." affirmed the FPC's assertion
of jurisdiction, and the producer immediately abandoned the transac-
tion without FPC approval. Subsequently, the FPC denied the seller's
request for abandonment approval and ordered the seller to take a
certificate for the abandoned transaction."4 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the Commission was empowered to condi-
tion the issuance of the "mandatory" certificate on (1) payment of
refunds for charges collected in excess of a proper in-line price from
the time the seller had originally been on notice of its jurisdictional
status, and (2) payment for abandonment damages incurred by the
buyer in obtaining more expensive replacement gas."
The result in Mesa Petroleum appears to conflict with the tradi-
tional ban against FPC reparation power 6 and the presumption
81. 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
82. Hugoton Production Company, the original producer-seller in Mesa Petroleum, owned
gas leases in Kansas and contracted with its parent corporation for the sale of natural gas to
be commingled in buyer's interstate pipeline but to be restricted in use to buyer's compressor
stations within the same state. Id. at 183-84. The FPC asserted jurisdiction over this type of
sale in Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F.P.C. 606 (1961).
83. 379 U.S. 366, 368-70 (1965).
84. Hugoton Production Co., 41 F.P.C. 490, 501, 80 P.U.R.3d 170, 179 (1969).
85. 441 F.2d at 186-89.
86. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1972:115]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
against FPC retroactive rate-making power"7 since the FPC was al-
lowed not only to order a producer to obtain a certificate, but to
condition the "acceptance" of that certificate upon retroactive refund
of overcharges assessed and damages caused during a time when the
jurisdictional nature of the sale was in serious doubt. 8  The court
seemed to be aware of the lack of FPC reparation power89 but it failed
to draw or develop a clear line of distinction between lawful "refund"
powers and unlawful "reparations." There are three considerations,
however, which lend support to the outcome in Mesa Petroleum and
help distinguish those situations in which a retroactive remedy will be
deemed an authorized "refund" and not a forbidden "reparation."
First, the underlying consumer-benefit purpose of the Act justifies
the equitable utilization of the certificate-conditioning powers of the
Commission. In using its certification powers equitably, the FPC
should be able to place the consumer in as good a position as if the
supplier had complied with the Act.9" If the seller in Mesa Petroleum
had applied for a certificate immediately upon the FPC's assertion of
jurisdiction, its rates would have been quickly established at the in-
line level and there would have been no excessive charges nor aban-
donment damages. Having violated the Act by failing to file for certi-
fication and by abandonment, however, the seller caused prolonged
injury to his immediate buyer, much of which was undoubtedly passed
on to the consumer. Since it is now settled that FPC refunds can be
flowed through to the consumer,9 the certificate-conditioning refund
87. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
88. The FPC's jurisdictional decision, see note 82 supra, had first been reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. FPC, 323 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963),
rev'd, 379 U.S. 366 (1965). Because the jurisdictional issue was unclear until the final Supreme
Court resolution, the FPC took a reasonably soft stand in all cases prior to Hugoton Production
Co., by agreeing to settle for refunds of only 62.5% of excess charges collected during jurisdic-
tional periods (the "Mobil" formula). See George Despot et al., 39 F.P.C. 232-37, 237-40,
472-75, 555-59 (1968); 38 F.P.C. 104146 (1967). Hugoton Production Company, the producer
in Mesa Petroleum, offered a similar settlement, 441 F.2d at 185. The FPC denied this settle-
ment offer on the ground that Hugoton was the only seller of the group who had abandoned its
sale after the Supreme Court's jurisdictional decision. However, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit remanded for a more "cogent explanation by the Commission of the different
treatment given Hugoton and its relevance to the Natural Gas Act." Id. at 192. The FPC may
have difficulty doing this in view of recent judicial approval of the "Mobil formula" in Pla-
quemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1334, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 103-15 infra).
89. See note 100 infra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 40 supra, 98 infra, and accompanying texts.
91. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text. In apparent anticipation of investigating
the equity of flowing through the refund award in Mesa Petroleum, the FPC ordered the Mesa
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is the most effective weapon for compensating the consumer and
thereby achieving the underlying purpose of the Act. Regardless of the
balance of the equities between the FPC, the wholesale buyer, and the
producer-seller, therefore, this refund power should always be mobi-
lized in situations like Mesa Petroleum wherever injury to the ultimate
consumer is probable.
A second consideration which justifies the holding in Mesa Petro-
leum is that the express FPC power to prevent abandonment includes
an appurtenant power to require a previously uncertified seller to take
a certificate on a jurisdictional sale which he has already abandoned.92
Once it is accepted that a certificate may be issued in such a situation,
the versatile FPC power to condition certificates will apply and re-
funds can be ordered.
A third underlying consideration in Mesa Petroleum is that the
increasingly aggressive and uniform rate regulation of natural gas
producers under the Natural Gas Act93 requires relaxation of the
judicial unwillingness to allow FPC retroactive rate remedies. While
the original legislative intent was that natural gas ratemaking should
be based primarily on private contracting, the advent of FPC rate
regulation by in-line pricing and maximum area rates for field mar-
kets indicates a trend toward uniformity of rates and more affirmative
FPC rate control. Fairness requires that those who evade the increas-
ingly uniform controls should not benefit in comparison to those who
abide by the Act. Therefore, the need for FPC refund powers to
achieve equitable administration of the Natural Gas Act is greater
than in earlier years.
Petroleum seller to hold the refunds "subject to further order of the Commission directing the
disposition of the amount." Hugoton Production Co., 41 F.P.C. 490, 501, 80 P.U.R.3d 170,
180 (1969).
92. The authority for this proposition is, admittedly, nowhere established by the court in
Mesa Petroleum, but seems to follow from J.M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 550 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1956). In that case, an uncertified, independent natural gas producer
brought into the Act's jurisdiction by the Supreme Court's Phillips decision, see note 17 supra,
applied for certification under protest. The producer later withdraw its application, stated that
it was unwilling to accept a certificate, and advised the FPC that it was terminating natural
gas deliveries. In response to this, the FPC denied abandonment and issued a certificate. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the FPC's authority to order a certificate. 236
F.2d at 556. "[U]nder the law and facts petitioner's unwillingness to accept its certificate offers
no real problem . . . . In Section 7(c) as amended there is nothing about the need of a gas
company accepting a certificate. As we see it, with the certificate properly issued, Huber's
attempted defiance of the Commission's rightful exercise of its authority is of no importance."
Id. at 557.
93. See notes 63-68 supra and accompanying text.
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When the above considerations are combined, the extraordinary
retroactive remedies authorized in Mesa Petroleum can be justified.
The analysis starts at the point where the transaction becomes juris-
dictional and the natural gas seller has a duty to seek certification. 4
By failing to submit promptly to FPC jurisdiction, the Niagara Mo-
hawk line of cases95 dictates that the seller later becomes subject to a
back-dated certificate. Hence the producer can be deemed to have a
"constructive" certificate from the date jurisdiction originally at-
tached. A refusal to submit to FPC jurisdiction will also, after the
CATCO decision,96 deprive the Commission of an opportunity to
review the contract rate to assure that an in-line price is assessed.
Consequently, the lawfulness of the seller's present rate is immediately
questionable, and the seller's "constructive" certificate can be
equated to a "suspect" or "temporary" certificate under the Callery
and Sunray rationales." When certification is finally granted (or or-
dered), therefore, such a characterization will permit the assessment
of retroactive refunds for charges collected in excess of the final, in-
line price.
The award of damages for the illegal abandonment can be justified
as an equitable remedy collateral to the authorized assessment of the
retroactive refunds and a necessary expedient to enable the FPC to
fulfill the underlying consumer-oriented purpose of the Natural Gas
Act. Under equitable principles,98 the Commission should have the
authority to require the wrongdoer to make amends for other injuries,
such as abandonment damages, which were proximately caused by his
statutory violations prior to final certification. It would be inequitable
to permit the abandoner to flaunt the Act's provisions and thereby
cause injury to the public or gain adVantage for himself over other
similarly situated sellers who file for certification promptly and con-
tinue operation. The abandonment damages award in Mesa Petro-
leum is justified, then, as a necessary and equitable means of avoiding
these undesirable results.
Limited to its facts, Mesa Petroleum holds that the FPC is em-
94. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
95. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 56, 58 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 73-74, 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
98. "The principles of equity are not to be isolated as a special province of the courts" and
are available to administrative agencies. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153,
160 (D.C. Cir. 1967); accord, Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 1971).
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powered to use its certificate-conditioning refunds to redress rate-
based damages caused by failure to file for certification and by illegal
abandonment. There is language in the opinion, however, which sup-
ports the policing of other types of wrongful conduct by use of this
refund power. Various interpretations of the case lead to the applica-
tion of the certificate-conditioning refund power to three different
echelons of pecuniary injury. The narrowest interpretation indicates
that certificate-conditioning refunds are authorized to correct rate-
based99 violations of only the certification provisions of the Act. This
view follows from express language in the court's opinion:
There is ... no basis for [petitioner's] claim that, since the Commission lacks
authority to award reparations, it is also without [thelauthority to correct a
failure to comply with the certificate provisions of the Natural Gas Act by an
unauthorized abandonment.10
The broadest interpretation of Mesa Petroleum is solicited from other
statements of the court to the effect that the Commission has author-
ity to correct "abuses preceding the final certification" and
"improper actions occurring prior to a permanent certificate
....* ."'" This language infers that the FPC can fashion its certifica-
tion refunds to correct rate-based damages caused by any wrongful
conduct, presumably including common-law as well as statutory vio-
lations. Finally, an intermediate and more reasonable interpretation
is that the FPC refund power extends to rate-based damages for any
statutory violation of the Natural Gas Act occurring during periods
of "constructive" certification.10 2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Plaquemines
Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC10 3 gave additional support to the doctrine
implied in Mesa Petroleum that the FPC has equitable power to order
refunds by constructive certification. The Plaquemines court also
adopted the intermediate interpretation of the reach of Mesa Petro-
leum and set standards for equitable application of the FPC
99. As a preface to further discussion, it should be noted that the certificate-conditioning
refund remedy, at least as developed thus far in the law, applies only to injuries resulting from
transactions which are in some way related to rates and prices. See text preceding note 1 supra
and following note 113 infra. The refund power in regulated industries is primarily, if not
exclusively, a rate-regulation sanction. See generally, Note, Use of Refund Device in Rate
Regulation, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1023-32 (1950).
100. 441 F.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 189 & n.15 (emphasis added).
102. See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
103. 450 F.2d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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certificate-conditioning refunds. The court in Plaquemines considered
an FPC refund order fashioned against a pipeline company who, like
the producer in Mesa Petroleum, had awaited the outcome of the
Supreme Court's Lo-Vaca decision" 4 before seeking certification of
a jurisdictional sale. In approving the FPC's refund authority, the
court pronounced:
[T]he Commission, in acting upon applications for certification filed some time
after Commission jurisdiction was asserted (in this case about 5 years), has the
equitable power "to regard as being done that which should [be] done" by
recreating thepast, insofar as is reasonably possible, to reflect compliance with
the Act and to order refunds to be paid if necessary to achieve that goal.'
Hence the refund power is deemed broad enough to reconstruct and
correct any rate-based violation of the Natural Gas Act, and the
intermediate interpretation of Mesa Petroleum' has become the pres-
ent state of the law.
In Plaquemines, a rate increase took effect during a pipeline com-
pany's jurisdictional and uncertified status pursuant to an escalation
clause in its sales contract which had been privately negotiated prior
to assertion of jurisdiction by the FPC. When the pipeline company
finally filed for a long-overdue certificate, the Commission found that
the original rate had been in-line with contemporaneous producer
rates and therefore was exempt from refund.10 7 The later rate increase,
however, was declared invalid because it was not filed with the FPC
before taking effect.' The Commission then subjected the seller to
automatic refund liability without reviewing the validity of the rate
increase.'09 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the FPC's
refund order on the grounds that
having started out to reconstruct [the seller's] sales to reflect compliance with
the Act, the Commission was bound to carry that purpose through in regard
to all transactions that would have been subjects of filings had [the seller] been
complying with the Act in the [jurisdictional period].110
Hence, for refund purposes, the mere act of changing an uncertified
104. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
105. 450 F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
106. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
107. 450 F.2d at 1336-37.
108. Such filing is required by the Natural Gas Act § 4(d), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1970).
See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
109. 450 F.2d at 1335.
110. Id. at 1338.
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rate is not per se a violation of the Act. The FPC must make a
retroactive determination of the validity of the increased rate before
assessing a refund.
The Plaquemines case supports the premises and implications of
the Mesa Petroleum decision and pronounces a standard for equitable
application of this refund power. Before ordering refunds, the FPC is
admonished to use "reasoned retroactive application of [the] statute"
by "reconstructing. . .jurisdictional sales . . . to reflect compliance
with the Act." '' What is envisioned is a step-by-step process in which
(1) a seller is "constructively" certified by an FPC jurisdictional
decision; (2) his compliance with the Act is monitored, retroactively,
by using alternative standards of measurement where primary stan-
dards are unavailing" 2 and by "resolv[ing] any doubts regarding com-
pliance against the wrongdoer;"" 3 and (3) refunds are ordered only
where actual rate-based damage is caused by statutory violations.
Plaquemines is significant also because it applies the certificate-
conditioning refund power in a situation involving a pipeline com-
pany. Although the previous refund developments had all evolved
from the regulation of natural gas producers, there is nothing in
CA TCO, Callery, Sunray, or Mesa Petroleum which inherently limits
their applicability to that segment of the industry. Plaquemines makes
it clear that the in-line price doctrines and certificate-conditioning
refund power can be extended to the pipeline company and wholesale
distributor" 4 segments of the natural gas industry.15
Future Refund Developments Under the Natural Gas Act
As a result of Mesa Petroleum, Plaquemines, Callery and Sunray,
the FPC may use its certificate-conditioning refunds to correct any
rate-based injury caused the ultimate consumer by violations of the
11. Id. at 1338, 1339 n.15 (emphasis by the court).
112. Although cost of service data, which was normally used to review pipeline company
rates, was unavailable, the FPC was reprimanded for failing to use contemporaneous producer
in-line prices as an alternative standard. Id. at 1339-41.
113. Id. at 1338 n.13.
114. The interstate natural gas industry traditionally has been viewed as being divided into
three functions: (1) production of the gas and sale for resale in interstate commerce, see note
17 supra; (2) transmission of the gas in interstate commerce (performed by "pipeline compa-
nies"); and (3) wholesale distribution to retail sellers. See A. LEESTON, J. CRICHTON, J. JACOBS,
THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 93 (1963). Of course, any two, or all of these functions
may in practice be performed by the same corporate entity.
115. See Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Act occurring when a seller has a "suspect,""' temporary,"' or "con-
structive""118 certificate. Although such broad use of refund orders
seems to indicate possession of traditional reparation powers, each
decision has expressed a cognizance of the lack of such power by the
FPC."9 It is the thesis of this section, therefore, that as a result of
expanding judicial construction and more aggressive FPC use of the
certificate-conditioning authority, the scope of the traditional ban on
FPC reparation power has been narrowed and the general presump-
tion against FPC retroactive rate-making authority has been rebutted
by the judicial recognition of this broad certificate-conditioning re-
fund power in the FPC for use in permanent certification proceedings.
The end result of these developments, therefore, appears to be a judi-
cial broadening of the definition of "refund" and narrowing of the
definition of "reparation." Two possible distinctions between author-
ized "refunds" and unauthorized "reparations" are offered which
might conform to the implications of the cases discussed. First, the
distinction which adheres more realistically to the case law suggests
that the prohibition against FPC reparations is altogether inapplica-
ble to the regulation of rates through certification powers. Callery,
Sunray, Plaquemines, and Mesa Petroleum can be read as having
exempted certificate-conditioning refunds from the definition of "re-
parations" as long as (1) the retroactive refund order reaches back
no further than the time when the duty to become certified first at-
tached and hence the seller became "constructively" certified, and
(2) prospective refund liability is halted when permanent, non-
reviewable certification is finally achieved.' Pursuant to this ration-
116. The Callery rationale, see notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text.
117. The Sunray rationale, see notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
118. The Mesa Petroleum rationale, see notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text; and the
Plaquemines rationale, see notes 103-06, 111-113 supra and accompanying text.
119. FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 24 (1968); United Gas Improvement Co. v.
Callery Prop., Inc., 382 U.S. 223, 229 (1965); Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 450 F.2d
1334, 1338 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 189 (5th Cir.
1971).
120. The Sunray decision lends support to the establishment of this second cut-off point for
the scope of FPC certification refund orders:
It seems incontestable that if a producer consistently sells gas at a price specified in a
final, permanent certificate . . ., the Commission may not order it to make refunds
simply because the just and reasonable rate for its area turns out to be below the in-line
price. This would amount to a reparation order, and this Court has repeatedly held that
the Commission has no reparation power . . . . We therefore . . . hold that an initial
price which is authorized in a final, unconditioned permanent certificate is a lower limit
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ale, any damage award premised on conduct occurring before a party
has a duty to become certified or after his certificate is approved
"finally" would be defined as a "reparation order" and would be
beyond the reach of the FPC.
An alternative and more far-reaching distinction would be one
which turns on a notice factor and would not depend on the proper
exercise of certificate-conditioning authority. According to this dis-
tinction, whenever a seller is on notice of the suspect nature of his rate
schedule, even if he is already operating under a permanent, non-
reviewable certificate, any rate-based damages awarded thereafter
might be seen as "refunds" and be within FPC cognizance. "Repara-
tions" would then be confined to retroactive damages occurring be-
fore the seller is given the requisite notice or resulting from other than
rate-making transactions. As developed earlier, this notice factor is
present in all of the cases where certificate-conditioning refunds have
been judicially authorized. Thus, the appeal or rehearing of a perma-
nent certificate, the mere issuance of a temporary certificate, or the
constructive certification of a seller by virtue of an FPC jurisdictional
decision are each deemed a sufficient event to place the jurisdictional
seller on notice of the questionable validity of his present rate. 12' In
each situation, therefore, the "notice" theory would justify imposi-
tion of FPC refund orders retroactively back to the time at which
notice was imparted. This is the identical result which the courts have
reached in the same factual situations under conventional certificate-
conditioning analysis.
The "notice" distinction of the refund/reparation dichotomy is
equally capable of justifying the statutory section 4 refund order.
During the course of section 4 rate-change proceedings, a seller whose
proposed rate is suspended and then given automatic effect is put on
constructive notice of potential refund liability by the express provi-
sions of the statute.'22 Consequently, the notice prerequisite is satisfied
and the subsequent FPC "refund" order is lawful and justified. The
most radical application of this alternate refund/reparation distinc-
tion would be in section 5 rate-fixing proceedings, where FPC deci-
below which a refund cannot be ordered under section 4(e) [the rate-change provision].
FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9,24 (1968).
121. See, e.g., Callery, notes 73-74 supra, Sunray, notes 78-79 supra, Mesa Petroleum, notes
95-97 supra, and Plaquemines, notes 103, 105-06 supra and accompanying texts.
122. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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sions are "to be thereafter observed and in force"' and have tradi-
tionally been prospective from the date of the final order. 12 By apply-
ing the "notice" distinction, however, when a complaint is filed with
the FPC and a formal, rate-fixing proceeding begun, the seller would
be put on actual notice of his suspect rate schedule. Hence the final
rate-fixing order would not be limited to absolute prospectivity but
would entail a quasi-retroactive "refund" back to the time the com-
plaint was filed.125 Although such an approach violates traditional
practices of FPC prospective ratemaking in section 5 proceedings, the
"notice" theory of authorized refunds offers a potential route for
expansion if the FPC envisions more aggressive rate regulation in the
future.
Under either theory, the Mesa Petroleum and Plaquemines
decisions offer great incentive for the FPC use of refund orders during
certification proceedings to alleviate any harmful effects of over-
charges or damages caused by delayed filing, abandonment, or any
other analogous rate-based violations of the Natural Gas Act.
Conclusion
The expansion of FPC certificate-conditioning refund orders into
the realm of what have been traditionally considered reparations pow-
ers illustrates the extent to which courts and an agency will go to
develop sanctions which are necessary to fill a changing regulatory
role.2 6 The original concept that parties to wholesale natural gas
transactions needed a competitive market with minimal regulation
has been supplanted by consumer-oriented, uniform rate regulation
for newly certified natural gas producers. A natural consequence has
been the expansion of the scope of certification powers and refund
orders, and it must be concluded that with further consumer orienta-
123. Natural Gas Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
124. See notes 10-11, 27, 30supra and accompanying text.
125. See Transcontinental W. Air, Inc. v. CAB, 336 U.S. 601 (1949), where the CAB's
express statutory power to make its airmail carrier rates "effective from such date as it shall
determine to be proper," id. at 602, was deemed sufficient to permit the CAB to back-date a
rate-fixing order to the date of complaint. Id. at 603. "[T]he rates of carriers and other utilities
fixed by public authorities, while usually prospective, are sometimes made retroactive to the date
of the commencement of the rate-making proceeding." Id. at 605.
126. See generally McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L.
REv. 441,446 (1964).
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tion and the necessity to protect scarce natural resources, further
extension of equitable retroactive sanctions can be expected.1
27
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW-FEDERAL COURT
JURISDICTION
A. THE APA AS A STATUTORY GRANT OF JURISDICTION
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can hear
cases only under a specific jurisdictional grant from Congress. I Juris-
diction to hear claims involving federal agencies is most often con-
127. Since the Natural Gas Act was patterned after the regulatory scheme of its sister
statute, the Federal Power Act, Hearings on H.R. 11662 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 46 (1936); Flittie &
Armour, supra note 17, at 448, 453, it might be expected that the developments discussed herein
would also be applicable to activities regulated under the Federal Power Act. However, no such
analogous developments are evident. Furthermore, immediate extension of Callery, Sunray,
Plaquemines, and Mesa Petroleum to such activities is doubtful because the use of a certificate-
conditioning refund order has been predicated on the FPC's simultaneous licensing and rate-
regulating jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. The problem under the Federal Power Act
is that the FPC has no certification powers under Part II of the Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-28c
(1970), which grants its primary rate-regulatory power through jurisdiction over interstate
electric utilities. See note 4 supra. The FPC does have license-conditioning authority under Part
I of the Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 799, 803 (1970), but its jurisdiction to regulate rates under that part,
16 U.S.C. §§ 812-13 (1970), is extremely limited and seldom exercised. See R. BAUM, THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION 176-77, 180 (1942); note 4
supra.
A jurisdictional overlap, on the other hand, could theoretically be construed by attempting
to bridge the separate parts of the Act. When a hydro-electric utility sells or transmits electricity
in interstate commerce, the FPC has jurisdiction under both parts of the Federal Power Act.
In this situation it has been held that provisions of Part I are repealed by implication by
inconsistent or conflicting provisions of the later enacted Part II, Safe Harbor Water Power
Co. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179, 185 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1949); Safe Harbor
Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 124 F.2d 800, 804 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 663 (1942),
and provisions not conflicting or inconsistent can be read together, see 179 F.2d at 186-88. If
the license-conditioning powers of Part I, therefore, can be construed together with the rate-
regulating powers of Part II, refund powers could presumably be implied from the two. The
problem with the above analysis, however, is that the legislative history indicates that a certifica-
tion provision was placed in the original draft of Part II of the Federal Power Act and elimi-
nated upon redrafting, see note 45 supra. Where Congress has thus intended that there be no
licensing powers under Part II of the Federal Power Act, it would be inconsistent to create
implied refunds by interposing the licensing powers of Part I into the rate-regulating provisions
of Part II. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
1. WRIGHT 15.
Vol. 1972:115]
